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the Ideology of Violent Extremists

Ben Clarke1

ANZSIL- ISIL Conference Delhi 5-6 December 2009

Abstract
Violent attacks by radical Islamists against civilians represents a serious and continuing threat to human
security in a number of States, including India and to a lesser extent Australia. Causes of such violence
have been extensively debated in the literature of a variety of disciplines including law, psychology and
political science.2 This paper examines one aspect of this debate: the use by extremists of concepts
derived from Islamic law to justify violence against civilians. It does so by identifying religious norms
that underpin the ideology of radical Islamists who engage in terrorism. The thesis advanced here is
that an effective response to such violence requires, among other things, that the ideology propagated
by radical Islamists be challenged. To do so, their approach to interpretation and application of Islamic
law must be refuted. It is argued that Muslim States and the schools of Islamic jurisprudence must
energetically engage in this task if the ideology that motivates such attacks is to be thoroughly
discredited. Until this occurs, it will be difficult to counter the process of radicalisation of young
Muslims who, through exposure to the ideology of radical Islamist organisations such as al-Qaeda and
Jamaa Islamia ('JI'), often regard violence against civilians as permitted by their religion.

1 PhD (Melbourne), LLM (Bristol), LLB (Tasmania). Associate Professor, University of Notre Dame Australia. Member
of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies (University of Western Australia). Ben is a member of the Centre for
Muslim States and Societies (University of Western Australia) and the Research Unit for the Study of Society, Law and
Religion (University of Adelaide, Australia). Email: bclarke@nd.edu.au.
2 For a discussion of the importance of inter-disciplinary analysis of the causes and cures of terrorism see: SPECIFIC
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES: NEW PRIORITIES, IN PARTICULAR TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM
Terrorism and human rights Final report of the Special Rapporteur, Kalliopi K. Koufa E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 25 June
2004, page 2.

1. Introduction
According to a range of radical Islamist groups who have deliberately engage in violence against
civilians, their actions are justified under Islamic law.3 Such groups have often argued, by reference to
the Koran and other sources of Islamic law, that extra-judicial violence against civilians is a permissible
response to actual or perceived injustices against Muslims.4 Much of the literature on religious
justifications for violence by Islamists centres around the notion of violent jihad.5 However other
norms are referred to by radical Islamists to justify attacks on civilian and other targets. This paper
highlights one of them: the notion that Islamic law requires apostasy to be punished by death. The
nature of these beliefs is examined, together with the debate among Muslim scholars as to the scope of
Islamic law on punishment of apostasy. The importance of this debate for States that face ongoing
threats of violence by radical Islamists is highlighted. Proposals are then offered as to how the
ideology of violent extremists may be refuted by reference to Islamic law and the role that States,
international organisations and Islamic schools of jurisprudence may play in refuting the ideology of
radical Islamists. Before exploring these matters, the nature of the threat from violent Islamists to
Australia and India is briefly noted. Law and policy responses of States to such extremism are briefly
noted. It is argued that while these responses may be necessary, they may not be sufficient to counter
the ideology that motivates radical Islamists to engage in violence. A further matter raised here is
whether the The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ('Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy')6 needs to be revised to deal with this issue.

3 See Section 4 below.
4 Ibid.
5 See for example: Shaheen S. Ali, and Javaid Rehman, ‘The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law’ (2005) 10(3)
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 321-343; Hilmī Zawā
Zawā tītī ,, Is Jihā d a Just War?: War, Peace, and Human Rights
Under Islamic and Public (2001); Abdallah Saeed, ‘Jihad and Violence: Changing Understandings of Jihad Among
Muslims’[72], in Tony Coady & Michael O’Keefe, Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in a Threatened World
(2002).
6 The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is annexed Plan of action (A/RES/60/288). See
http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml Accessed 19 September 2009.

2. A Common Experience
2.1 India
Over the last decade, hundreds of Indian and Australian citizens have been killed and injured in various
attacks carried out by radical Islamists. India has suffered numerous attacks of this kind over a number
of years. Only two are mentioned here. They include the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks which claimed
166 lives. This violence was carried out by Pakistani nationals who were trained, equipped and
financed by the radical Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba.7 On 20 July 2009, Mohammad Ajmal Kasab,
the lone surviving gunman from the group of 10 attackers, expressed his wish to plead guilty to the
charges against him.8 They included murder and waging war against India.9 The attacks were
launched at luxury hotels, Mumbai’s main railway station, a restaurant and a Jewish center.10 The
same organisation carried out the 2003 Mumbai bombings, which claimed 52 lives. Three members of
Lashkar-e-Taiba were sentenced to death in August 2009 for their involvement in these attacks,
following their conviction on charges of murder, criminal conspiracy and terrorism.11 They have
appealed their death sentences.12

7 See Zahid Hussain, "Islamabad Tells of Plot by Lashkar" The Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2009. Available at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124872197786784603.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. Accessed 28 July 2009. 'Lashkar-eTaiba responsible for Mumbai terroristic act' 28 November 2009
http://www.hindu.com/2008/11/28/stories/2008112862080100.htm.; Mark Mazetti, (28 November 2008), "US
Intelligence focuses on Pakistani Group", The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29intel.html?partner=permalink&exprod=permalink Accessed 20
September 2009.
.
8 Sukanya Shetty , Mustafa Plumber, 'I confess... please end my trial, deliver your judgment' Indian Express 20 July 2009.
Available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/kasab-confesses-to-role-in-26-11-terror-attacks/491739. Accessed 19
September 2009.
9 For details of the charges see: Hari Kumar, 'Pakistani charged in Mumbai assault' The New York Times (26 February
2009). http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/world/asia/26mumbai.html?_r=1 Accessed 19 September 2009.
10 'Pakistani charged in Mumbai assault' The New York Times (26 February 2009)
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/world/asia/26mumbai.html Accessed 19 September 2009; 'Kasab seeks translated
copy of charges sheet'
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/2611_trial_Kasab_seeks_translated_copy_of_chargesheet/articleshow/4246845.
cms Accessed 19 September 2009.
11 "Death for three in 2003 Mumbai bomb blasts case". The Hindu. 7 August 2009.
http://www.hindu.com/2009/08/07/stories/2009080757860100.htm at 13 October 2009.
12 Phil Hazelwood, 'Death penalty for 2003 Mumbai bombers' 6 August 2009, Available at
http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/death-penalty-for-2003-mumbai-bombers-20090806-ebex.html, Accessed
13 September 2009.

2.2 Australia
Over a hundred Australians have lost their lives in violence commited by racial Islamists during the last
decade. All such attacks have occurred outside of Australia. The most lethal attacks in terms of the
loss of Australian lives occurred on 12 October 2002 at the Sari Club and Paddy’s Pub in Kuta Bali.
These attacks were organized and conducted by members of JI.13 88 Australians were killed in these
attacks which left a total of 202 people dead with a further 240 injured.14 On 9 November 2008, after
exhausting all avenues of appeal, three persons convicted of carrying out the bombings (Imam
Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim, and Ali Ghufron) were executed by firing squad.15
A number of radical Islamist networks operating inside Australia have been disrupted in recent years
before planned attacks were carried out. In 2009, various members of Islamist cells were convicted and
sentenced for planning violent attacks in Sydney and Melbourne.16

3. A Common Response
India and Australia have responded to violence against their citizens through rule of law based
measures. These include investigation of the crimes, prosecution of alleged perpetrators, expansion of
criminal laws to ensure that peripheral actors involved in attacks of this kind may be brought to justice
and the provision of extra-territorial jurisdiction to courts to grant them authority to deal with offshore
crimes of this nature where necessary.17 At a policing level, there has been enhanced cooperation
between the investigative branches in various States. In the case of the Bali bombings, Australia
provided forensic and other assistance to Indonesian authorities, who prosecuted a number of members
of JI who were subsequently convicted of a number of crimes arising from their involvement in the

13 Gerard Chaliand, Arnaud Blin, The history of terrorism: from antiquity to al Qaeda (2007) 46-347.
14 Subsequent attacks include the 9 September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and the 1 October
2005 Bali bombings.
15 Irwan Firdaus, "Indonesia executes Bali bombers" The Jakarta Post (9 November 2008).
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/11/09/indonesia-executes-bali-bombers.html. Accessed 9 September 2009.
16 Meraiah Foley, ' Australian terrorist sentenced to 15 years' New York Times, 3 February 2009, Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/world/asia/03iht-03terror.19886637.html Accessed 19 September 2009; 'Terrorism
cell member jailed for 5 years' ABC News (Australia) 2 September 2009, Available at:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/09/02/2674854.htm Accessed 19 September 2009.
17 For Australian terrorism offences passed after 11 September 2001, see: Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), Schedule 1, Part 5.3
(Terrorism) divisions 100-103.

attacks.18 This cooperation has been reinforced by bilateral agreements,19 other forms of cooperation,20
and implementation of certain measures outlined in Chapter VII resolutions of the UN Security Council
21

as well as the UN General Assembly's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.22 What is absent from the

these resolutions is any obligation upon States and international organisations to cooperate in refuting
the ideology of radical Islam through interpretation of Islamic Law.

4. Reliance on Religious Norms to Justify Violence against Civilians: The practise of al-Qaeda and
affiliated organisations
The issue of religious justifications offered for violence against civilians has gained international
attention following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.23 The architects of these attacks, alQaeda, have sought to justify acts leading to the loss of civilian lives on the basis of religious norms.24
Such consequences are often excused by the organisation as necessary measures aimed at the expulsion
of non-Muslim armies from Muslim lands or the overthrow of ‘apostate governments.’25 Such

18 See Note 14 below.
19
See the bilateral Counter-Terrorism Memorandum of Understanding (2002) between Australia and Indonesia,
extended for 3 years in 2008. See Indonesia Country Brief (DFAT)
http://www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html Accessed 19 September 2009.
20 See The Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation
(Lombok Treaty), signed by Foreign Ministers in Lombok, 13 November 2006.
21 See for example: UN Security Council Resolution 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1373. A comprehensive list of UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism is available at:
http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml Accessed 8 July 2009.
22 See above n 6 (Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy). See Indonesia Country Brief (Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade). Available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/GEO/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html Accessed 19 September
2009.
23 See: Mark Juergensmeyer, 'From Bhindranwale to Bin Laden: The Rise of Religious Violence' (October 14,
2004). Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies. Paper 20.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/gis/20 ; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious
Violence (2004). But see Robert A Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005). See also:
Shmuel Bar, 'The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism', Policy Review No. 125, June & July 2004 Available at
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3438276.html See also: Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel: My Life (2007, Free
Press), 169–92 .
24 See: ‘Al Qaeda Fatwa: World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders’, published in al-Quds al-Arabi (London UK),
23 February 1998, 3. But see letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005. (al-Zawahiri
deals with the issue of fighting Shi’ite (‘ apostates’) in some detail and encourages al-Zarqawi not to be distracted from
the main target: US forces.) Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawiletter_9jul2005.htm accessed 13 October 2009.
25 See for example: 'Purported bin Laden tape urges Somalis to overthrow new president' 19 March 2009 CBC New
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/03/19/somalia-alqaeda-binladen.html Accessed 19 September 2009. See also
letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi dated 9 July 2005. Available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm accessed 13 October
2009.

justifications are outlined in: speeches by prominent figures including Osama bin Laden, Ayman alZawahiri and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi; video messages left by suicide bombers prior to terrorist attacks
in countries including the UK, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel; and video recordings made during the
beheading of unarmed hostages (eg in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq). During these various
presentations, Islamic law (including verses of the Qur’an and Hadith) is often recited. A classic
example is an al-Qaeda videocassette, broadcast on al Jazeerah TV satellite network in December
2004, in which Osama bin Laden reads a letter to "To the Muslims in Iraq in Particular and The
[Islamic] Nation in General." The speech directly invokes the doctrine of apostasy. It states:
"Aiding America, or the Allawi government [in Iraq] which is apostate [Murtada], or the Karzai
government [in Afghanistan], or the Mahmoud Abbas government [in the Palestinian Authority]
which is apostate, or the other apostate governments in their war against the Muslims, is the
greatest apostasy of all, and amounts to abandonment of the Muslim community.

Participation in the Iraqi or Palestinian Elections Is Apostasy
"Muslims must beware of these kinds of elections. They must unite around the Jihad warriors and
those who resist the occupiers." He continued, "Anyone who participates in these elections … has
committed apostasy against Allah."26
In similar fashion, Al-Zarqawi brands the Shi'ite apostates for their heretical beliefs in a letter
purportedly written to senior al-Qaeda leaders. The letter was seized by Coalition forces in a raid on a
safe house in January 2004.27 The author is committed to ‘fighting the sects of apostasy.’ In exploiting
the notion of apostasy to justify an ideology of hatred and violence,28 criminal organisations such AQI
follow a long tradition of invoking Islamic jurisprudence on the punishment of kafir (heretical belief) to
justify the killing of those with different political or religious views. In modern times, this tradition can
be traced back to Egyptian dissident Sayyid Qutb, who argued (from his gaol cell) that it was necessary
to rid not only the Islamic world but also the entire planet, of the "structure" of Jahiliyya (godless

Relevant extracts from the letter are available at;
<http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP83704&Page=archives> Accessed 13 October 2009.
27 The letter is available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html Accessed 13 October 2009.
28 This phenomenon has been critiqued in a number of programme on Arab satellite channels. Al Arabiya highlights the
problem in Sinaat al-Mawt (Death Industry). It is argued below that abolishing laws that required the punishment of
apostasy is one way of undermining the death industry and the international harm it causes to respect for the Islamic
principles invoked by extremists.

26

ignorance).29 Qubt's writings inspired Ayman al-Zawahiri, a senior al-Qaeda figure and apologist for its
ideology.30 Al-Zawahiri continues to promote an ideology that actively encourages criminal attacks on
civilians, including Muslims, who are deemed ‘apostates.’ This far-reaching doctrine has been invoked
to justify attacks upon non-Muslim States and also Muslim governments that are deemed apostate.31
Osama bin Laden’s theological direction was heavily influenced by both Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam
(a Palestinian academic who masterminded a new ultra-extreme form of wahhabism).32 Azzam, who
was killed by a massive explosion in Peshawar in 1989, was admired by bin Laden for both his
scholarship and his mujahedeen credentials (gained from his involvement in the jihad against Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan). Azzam’s legacy is a popular ideology, keenly exploited by bin Laden,
which justifies mass-killing in an attempt to overthrow ‘apostate’ regimes and eliminate those who
support them.33
At this juncture it is important to emphasize the contrast between the beliefs of violent extremists and
those of the vast majority of Muslims. Opinion polls suggest that most Muslims - while sympathetic to
some of the goals of al-Qaeda - regard the killing of civilians as contrary to Islam.34 Nonetheless,
reliance by violent extremists upon Islamic norms to justify their actions raises sensitive issues
regarding the nature and scope of such norms and who has the authority to enforce them.35 The
enforcement of penalties against apostates in a number of Muslim countries also leads to questions
about the example these States are setting for Non-State Actors (such as al-Qaeda) who invoke the
same doctrine (often together with the concept of jihad) to justify their criminal campaign of sectarian
29

See Abel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda (2006), 72-73.

30
Gene W. Heck, When Worlds Collide: Exploring the Ideological and Political Foundations of the Clash of
Civilisations (2007) 79.
31

See Atwan, above n 29, 176-178.

32
See Atwan, above n 29, 70. See also: Monte Palmer & Princes Palmer, Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity &
Challenges (2008) 147.
33 See Atwan, above n 29, 43, 193; Palmer & Palmer, above n 32, 146-7. On the ideological and para-military training of
the Mumbai bomber , see Aryn Baker and Jyoti Thottam, 'The Making of a Mumbai Terrorist' Time Magazine 8 March
2009 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1883334-3,00.html Accessed 20 September 2009. See also
"Mumbai Terrorist Wanted to Kill and Die and Become Famous, ABC News, 03-Dec-2008".
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=6385015&page=2. Accessed 20 September 2009. ("When we asked whether he
knew any verses from the Quran that described jihad, Ajmal Amir said he did not," police said. "In fact he did not know
much about Islam or its tenets," according to a police source.).
34 Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, Stephen Weber, Evan Lewis, Ebrahim Mohseni, 'Public Opinion in the Islamic World on
Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies', 25 February 2009, p23, Available at :
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/591.php Accessed 20 September 2009.
35 See Ben Clarke, ‘Law, Religion and Violence: A Human Rights-Based Response to the Punishment of Apostasy by State
and Non-State Actors’ (2009) 30(1) Adelaide Law Review (forthcoming).

violence. Moreover, this State practice is at odds with the obligations of States that are party to the
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966)36 ('ICCPR') to guarantee and protect the right to freedom
of religion and belief. Violence against apostates (whether judicial or extra-judicial in character)
cannot be reconciled with these ICCPR norms.37 Attention now turns to the debate among Muslim
scholars regarding whether apostasy should be punished.

5. Islam & Punishment of Apostasy: Two Very Different Schools of Thought
The punishment of apostasy has been described as 'one of the most contentious issues in Islam.'38
Whether 'earthly punishment' of apostasy is justified (or required) under Islam has been debate for
centuries. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the issue of penalty is of fundamental importance, in
various countries, to the fate of those deemed ‘apostates’. The debate about whether apostasy should
be punished arises because while apostasy is condemned in a number of verses of the Qur’an, no
earthly penalty for this sin is prescribed.39 As with all questions pertaining to Islamic law, analysis of
whether the killing of apostates is permitted requires an examination of the various sources of Islamic
law (fiqh). Islamic law is discovered by referring to a hierarchal body of sources or foundations (usul).
At the top of this hierarchy is the Koran, followed by sahih Hadith (authentic verses of the words of
Muhammed).40 The selective use of analogical reasoning (qiyas) is another source, although it not
universally accepted. Consensus (ijmā') of the recognised body of religious experts is a further
source.41 In order to ascertain whether such a consensus exists, reference may be had to interpretations
36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XX1), UN GAOR, 21st sess, supp no 16, UN Doc
A/6316 (1966).
37 See Section 6.1 below.
38
See Shaikh Abdur Rahman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, (2007, Revised Edition) vii.
39

See Qur’an 4: 90; Qur’an 5: 59; Qur’an 16: 108.

40
Authoritative Hadith are those which are Sahih. Sahih means 'of sound health'. Hadith of this character are of the
highest grade: their isnad (attestation) reflect the highest grades of transmission. Sahih Hadith yields certainty of
knowledge whereas Hadith that are weak (da'if) or even spurious (maudu) do not. See John Burton, An Introduction to the
Hadith (1994) 200. Farooq notes that: 'The vast and comprehensive body of Islamic laws (fiqh) critically rests on the
Hadith literature. Islamic scholars, including the experts in Hadith, have gone to a great extent to defend the sanctity of
Hadith literature and utilize it not just to expound Islamic knowledge, but also to formulate Islamic codes and laws
pertaining to the entire gamut of life.' Mohammad Omar Farooq, 'Islamic Law and the Use and Abuse of Hadith' (2006)
www.globalwebpost.com/farooqm/writings/islamic/law_Hadith.doc Accessed 3 July 2009. Nonetheless, some Hadith
identified as Sahih by eminent Muslim jurists are of doubtful accuracy. See Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi, Hadith Literature:
Its Origin, Development & Special Features (1993) 57-58; M. M. Azami, Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature
(1977) 92. Sahih (authentic) Hadith are usually mutawatir (derived from "continuously recurrent" or "a report by an
indefinite number of people related in such a way to preclude the possibility of their agreement to perpetuate a lie." See
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (2003) 93.
41

Jonathon Porter Berkey, The formation of Islam (2003) 145.

of the Qur’an and Hadith reached by jurists over the ages (including modernists). An exhaustive
review of all sources of Islamic law of relevance to the issue of punishment of apostasy is beyond the
word constraints of this article. However, attention is paid to key verses of the Qur’an (the primary
source of Islamic law) that deal with apostasy and those that emphasize freedom of religion and belief.
Regard is also had to Hadith that form the cornerstone of the traditional approach to punishment of
apostasy. The opinions of a range of classical and modernist Muslim jurists and other commentators
are also considered. Conclusions are then drawn with respect to whether the killing of apostates is
justified under Islamic law.

5.1 The Traditional View
Islam’s schools of jurisprudence (the Madh'hab)42 hold that sane adult male converts from Islam must
be executed – even in cases that do not involve treason or rebellion.43 This approach reflects Islamic
legal tradition dating back to Caliph Abu Bakr, who succeeded Mohammed as leader of the nascent
Muslim community. Pakistani writer on Islam and Islamic law, Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi, offers an
explanation for the tradition approach:
. . . the sayings and doings of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), the
decision and practice of the Caliph Abu Bakr (Allah be pleased with him), the consensus of the
opinion of the Companions of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) and
all the later Muslim jurists, and even certain verses of the Holy Qur’an all prescribe capital
punishment for an apostate.44
Siddiqi's remarks echo the views of many classical and contemporary Muslim jurists. In his article
'Apostasy and Human Rights', Ibn Warraq notes early Muslim jurists who cited verses of the Qur’an as

42
Four of these schools are Sunni (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali) and one is Shi’ite (Ja'fari). See Mohammed
Hameedullah Khan, The Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence: A Comparative Study (1997).
43
See Rahman Doi, Sharī 'ah: The Islamic Law (2007) 265; Patrick Sookhdeo, ‘Islamic Teaching on the
Consequences of Apostasy from Islam’ (2006), 1 Available at http://barnabasfund.org/UK/News/Archives/Islamic-Teachingon-the-Consequences-of-Apostasy-from-Islam.html?p=5&m=7%238&a=773&l=UK Accessed 9 July 2009; Yohanan
Friedman, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relationships (2003); Michael Nazir-Ali, Islam, a Christian
perspective (1984) 128. But see: Mashood Baderin, International Human Rights Law and Islamic Law (2003) 123-124,
128.
44

Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi, The Penal Law of Islam (1979) 97.

authority for the rule that apostates must receive the death penalty.45 An example is al-Shafi (died 820
C.E.), founder of one of the four orthodox schools of law of Sunni Islam. According to Shafi, Qur’an
2:217 meant that the death penalty should be prescribed for apostates.46 Qur’an 2:217 reads: '... But
whoever of you recants and dies an unbeliever, his works shall come to nothing in this world and the
next, and they are the companions of the fire for ever.' Al-Razi adopted the same approach in his
commentary on 2:217.47 Ibn Warraq also quotes commentaries by Baydawi (died c. 1315-1316) on
Qur’an 4:89. Baydawi interprets this passage of the Qur’an to mean 'Whosoever turns back from his
belief (irtada), openly or secretly, take him and kill him wheresoever ye find him, like any other
infidel.'48
As for modernists who follow the traditional approach to punishment of apostasy, they include the
popular 20th century Pakistani Muslim scholar Abul A‘la Mawdudi, whose Qur’anic commentary is
found in millions of Muslim homes.49 Mawdudi's views echo those of Majid Khadduri, who in the
1950s, stated that ‘theologians agree that apostasy a violation of the law punishable in this world and
the next. Not only is the person denies salvation in the next world but is liable to capital punishment by
the state.’ 50
However, close examination of the Qur’an and Hadith reveals that Islamic law on the punishment of
apostasy is not as clear-cut as its exponents of the traditional approach suggests. While the Qur’an
condemns apostasy as a sin,51 it does not mandate an earthly penalty.52 Instead, verses of the Qur’an
45
Ibn Warraq, 'Apostasy, Human Rights, Religion and Belief', paper delivered at “Victims of Jihad” Conference held
parallel to the UN’s 61st commission of Human Rights on 18th April 2005, Geneva, Switzerland (7 April 2004) (extensive
citations omitted).
46

Ibid.

47
Ibid. See S. Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam (1924) 34-35 (Note: Rahman highlights the inadequacy of
Zwemer’s uncritically endorsement of the approach of Al-Razi, see Rahman, above n 38, 24.). See also Fakhr al-din alRazi, al-Tafsir al-Kabir (Cairo ,1308 A.H.), Vol.2, lines 17-20.
48

Zwemer, Ibid, 33-34.

49
Sookhdeo, above n 43, 1. See Abul A‘la Mawdudi, The Punishment of the Apostate According to Islamic Law
(1963). English translation by Syed Silas Husain & Ernest Hahn (1994) 17.
50

Majid Khadduri, War And Peace in the Law of Islam (1955) , 149-150.

51

See Qur’an 4: 90; Qur’an 5: 59; Qur’an 16: 108.

52
See Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (2004), 79. See also Mahmoud
Ayoub, 'Religious Freedom and the Law of Apostosy in Islam' (1994) 20 Islamochristiana 75-91, 79.

dealing with apostasy are silent on this point.53 Muslim jurists who advocate the death penalty for
apostasy therefore rely upon ‘indirect verses of the Qur’an which they claim endorse their approach54
and various Hadith (a collection of the purported words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad).55
With respect to the Qur’an, Khadduri points to Qur’an 4:89, a verse dealing with hypocrisy.56 4:89
states:
They wish that you disbelieve as they have disbelieved, then you become equal. Do not
consider them friends, unless they mobilize along with you in the cause of God. If they turn
against you, you shall fight them, and you may kill them when you encounter them in war. You
shall not accept them as friends, or allies.
Other Muslim jurists, including former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Shaikh Abdur Rahman, have
rejected Khadduri's interpretation of 4:89. Rahman considers the claim that execution is
justified under this verse as being impossible in the whole context of the hypocrisy verses.57
Khuddari relies on a number of other verses of the Qur’an as justification for this position: Qur’an
2:214;58 Qur’an 4: 90-91;59 Qur’an 5:59;60 and Qur’an 16:108.61 Interestingly, none of these verses
53

See Qur’an 4: 90; Qur’an 5: 59; Qur’an 16: 108.
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one who condemned them because of their own behaviour. Do you want to guide those who are sent astray by
GOD? Whomever GOD sends astray, you can never find a way to guide them.
[4:89] They wish that you disbelieve as they have disbelieved, then you become equal. Do not consider them
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and you may kill them when you encounter them in war. You shall not accept them as friends, or allies.
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erupts, they fight against you. Unless these people leave you alone, offer you peace, and stop fighting you, you may
fight them when you encounter them. Against these, we give you a clear authorization.
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Qur’an 2.214:
'Or do you think that you would enter the garden while yet the state of those who have passed away
before you has not come upon you; distress and affliction befell them and they were shaken violently, so that the
Apostle and those who believed with him said: When will the help of Allah come? Now surely the help of Allah is

states that the death penalty must be imposed by an earthly authority. In interpreting these verses,
Khadduri states: ‘Although only the second of these four verses specifically states that [the] death
penalty should be imposed on those who apostasize or turn back from their religion, all commentators
agree that a believer who turns back from his religion (irtadda), openly or secretly, must be killed if he
persists in disbelief.’62 However the same writer concedes that ‘the law of apostasy did not prevent a
few believers, during Mohammed’s career, from reverting to polytheism.’ 63
As for the Hadith, one verse in particular is raised by Muslim jurists who hold the view that the death
penalty must be imposed for apostasy. It states: 'Kill the one who changes his religion'.64 Khadduri,
for example, offers up this Hadith as proof that apostates be put to death - without acknowledging its
weak foundation.65 This Hadith was transmitted from Muhammad by only one person (I.e. it was not
confirmed by others.) It is therefore ahad, or solitary Hadith. Kamali notes that the majority of
scholars “are in agreement that the prescribed penalties (hudud) cannot be established by solitary
Hadith (ahad), and that unbelief by itself does not call for the death penalty.”66 Such Hadith can be
contrasted with Mutawatir, a category of Hadith that means 'continuously recurrent' or 'a report by an
nigh!'
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Qur’an 4.90-91:
Except those who reach a people between whom and you there is an alliance, or who come to you, their
hearts shrinking from fighting you or fighting their own people; and if Allah had pleased, He would have given
them power over you, so that they should have certainly fought you; therefore if they withdraw from you and do
not fight you and offer you peace, then Allah has not given you a way against them.
You will find others who desire that they should be safe from you and secure from their own people; as
often as they are sent back to the mischief they get thrown into it headlong; therefore if they do not withdraw from
you, and (do not) offer you peace and restrain their hands, then seize them and kill them wherever you find them;
and against these We have given you a clear authority.
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Qur’an 5:59:
'Say: O followers of the Book! do you find fault with us (for aught) except that we believe in Allah and in
what has been revealed to us and what was revealed before, and that most of you are transgressors?'

61

Qur’an 16.108:
These are they on whose hearts and their hearing and their eyes Allah has set a seal, and these are the
heedless ones.
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Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (1997]) referring to Mahmud Shaltut, al-Islam
Aqidah wa-Shari’ah (1966) 292-93. See also Saeed & Saeed, above n 52, 64.

indefinite number of people related in such a way to preclude the possibility of their agreement to
perpetuate a lie.'67
Another justification offered for this approach to apostasy is legal tradition that developed around the
practice of the early Caliphs during and after the ridda wars. Khuddari notes that the rule was strictly
enforced after Mohammed’s death during the ridda wars and endorsed by the practice of the early
caliphs who executed apostates.68 Moreover, this practice was sanctioned by Imjā (i.e. unanimity of
opinion) and 'there is no disagreement as to its validity.’ 69 Yet, according to some Muslim jurists, the
dire situation that the nascent Muslim community found itself in during the riddah wars delimits the
boundaries of the rule on punishment of apostasy by execution. The Hanafi school of Sunni
jurisprudence, for example, only recognises that apostasy may be punished by death where the apostasy
is couple with acts of war against Islam.70
Even so, arguments raised by traditionalists in support of the death sentence in apostasy cases tend to
downplay an obvious difficulty: the requirement that a rule sanctioning the death penalty be founded
upon clear, reliable and unambiguous authority derived from the Qur’an and/or sahih Hadith. Ayoub
highlights this point in the following way:
Had the Qur’an considered apostasy a public offence deserving maximum punishment (hadd)
like theft, adultery or murder, these verses would have been the proper place for such a ruling.
In fact, traditions concerning the occasions of the revelation of the verses do not mention that
the persons who had turned away from the faith and later returned penitent were required to
make a public confession of their repentance. Nor was apostasy an issue of major concern for
classical commentators on these verses.71
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It is of interest that the Organisation of the Islamic Conference ('OIC'), which represents at least 57
Muslim countries, while recognising that apostasy is a sin, has avoided the issue of punishment of
apostates.72

5.2 The Minority View
A growing number of Muslims jurists and other commentators argue that Islamic law does not sanction
the earthly punishment of apostasy.73 Kamali notes that a minority of medieval Islamic jurists held this
view. They include the Hanafi jurist Sarakhsi (d. 1090), Maliki jurist Ibn al-Walid al-Baji (d. 494 AH)
and Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328).74 In recent years, a number of senior Islamic clerics
have issued fatwas that reflect this view. They include the Grand Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa75 (a Sunni
Muslim) and Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri76 (a Shi'ite Muslim).
Baderin highlights the main thrust of the 'no earthly punishment approach'. He notes that: ‘apostasy
simpliciter, in the sense of an individual denouncing Islam without more, whenever mentioned in the
Qur’an does not stipulate any worldly punishment, but is only describes apostasy as attracting 'severe
punishment in the hereafter.’77 Thus, ‘it is not the changing of ones religion simpliciter that is
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prohibited under Islamic law but its manifestation in a manner that threatens public safety, morals and
freedom of others, or even the existence of the Islamic State itself.’78
Saeed and Saeed summarise the central arguments against the 'earthly' punishment of apostasy:
1. The Qur’an offers no justification for temporal ('earthly') punishment of apostasy;79
2. Apostasy laws have been misused to eliminate opponents and sure up authoritarian regimes;80
and
3. These laws developed from isolated Hadith (ahad) and interpretations of these Hadith on the
basis of analogy (qiyas) and ijtihād.81 As these sources and their interpretation do not guarantee
certainty of knowledge (ilm qati) as understood in Islamic jurisprudence, Muslims in the
modern period have the opportunity to re-think these laws.82
Similar arguments have been presented by a range of other jurists. Many note that sahih Al-Bukhari
(9:57) ['He who changes religion kill him!'] is of doubtful authenticity and providence, having been
reported by one person only.83 Jordan notes that this verse is about treason rather than apostasy (i.e. to
face the death penalty, the apostate in question must wage war on Islam rather than merely renounce
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the faith).84 Forte notes that the verse reflects challenges faced by the nauseant Muslim community that
was fighting for its very existence in the aftermath of Mohammed's death. Its unity was threatened at
various times by defection, treachery, and insurrection by tribes that had returned to their pre-Islamic
beliefs.85 This distinction between treason (which is a threat to the government) and individual acts of
apostasy involving religious belief (which poses no such threat) is the reason why some Muslim States
do not prosecute individuals for simply leaving Islam for another religion.86
Various verses of the Qur’an may be invoked to argue against the earthly punishment of apostasy.
Grand Mufti Sheikh Ali Gomaa (Egypt) listed a number of these verses in a recent article that appeared in The

Washington Post. According to Gomaa, punishment of apostates 'is left until the Day of Judgement,
and it is not to be dealt with in the life of this world. It is an issue of conscience, and it is between the
individual and Allah.'87 Gomaa states that 'the essential question before us is can a person who is
Muslim choose a religion other than Islam? The answer is yes, they can because the Qur’an says, 'Unto
you your religion, and unto me my religion,' [Qur’an, 109:6], and, 'Whosoever will, let him believe,
and whosoever will, let him disbelieve,' [Qur’an, 18:29], and, 'There is no compulsion in religion. The
right direction is distinct from error,' [Qur’an, 2:256].'88
Other verses from the Qur’an that may be invoked to support this view, including this one: ‘exhort
them; your task is only to exhort. You cannot compel them [to believe].’ (Qur’an 88:21-22)
As for Hadith, Farooq points to a concreted example of 'how the Prophet handled a case of simple
apostasy, not related to any treason or rebellion.'89 Significantly, the death penalty was not imposed on
the apostate.90
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In concluding this discussion, it is clear that an increasing number of Muslim jurists do not agree with
the approach of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence on the issue of punishment of apostasy. There are
compelling arguments, derived from the text of the Qur’an, that whilst apostasy is a sin, Islam
guarantees religious freedom and does not compel Muslims to remain in the religion. Nor does it
mandate earthly punishment of those who chose to depart from the faith. Growing support for this
position reflects, inter alia, the influence of the human rights movement. Attention now turns to
whether the punishment of apostasy can be reconciled with international human rights law.91

6. The Punishment of Apostasy and Human Rights Standards
The relationship between Islamic law (as practiced in various States) and international human rights
standards has been examined by various international actors (including the UN Commission on Human
Rights) for decades.92 Apostasy is regarded as a crime under Islamic law and carries the death penalty
in various Muslim-majority States.93 Judicial punishment of apostasy has drawn international criticism
of the States involved.94 Unsurprisingly, a growing body of literature on human rights and the
punishment of apostasy has emerged, which forms part of a wider body of scholarship on the
Apostle refused. Then he came to him (again) and said, "O Allah's Apostle! Cancel my Pledge." But the Prophet refused
Then he came to him (again) and said, "O Allah's Apostle! Cancel my Pledge." But the Prophet refused. The bedouin finally
went out (of Medina) whereupon Allah's Apostle said, "Medina is like a pair of bellows (furnace): It expels its impurities
and brightens and clears its good.”
91
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relationship between Islam and human rights.95
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the right to freedom of religion and belief provides the
foundation for a human rights-based analysis of punishment of apostasy. This right is recognised under
a range of international instruments and resolutions, including United Nations General Assembly
resolutions, international human rights law treaties, and general comments of the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee. The key provisions on freedom of religion and belief include the following:
1. 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief’;96
2. ICCPR: ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice’;97
3. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief:98
‘[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This shall
include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice’;
‘[n]o one shall by subject to discrimination by any state, institution, group of persons, or
person on the grounds of religion or other belief’;99
and
‘[a]ll States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the
grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life’100

One of the purposes of the 1981 Declaration was to clarify the nature and scope of Article 18 of the
ICCPR. Like the UDHR, the 1981 Declaration is not legally binding upon States. Nonetheless, one
can infer a certain level of consensus regarding the right to conscience among state delegates who
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participated in drafting it.101
While the right to freedom of religion is a fundamental and well established human right, Baderin notes
that, as expressed in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, this right is not absolute.102 In the case of the freedom
to manifest ones religion or beliefs, these rights may only be subject to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others. Such limitations, however, do not include a right to take measures to
punish those who exercise the right to freedom of religion by changing or abandoning their religion. In
its second periodic ICCPR report, Sudan stated that conversion from Islam is not an offence in Sudan
per se, but only the manifestation of such conversion in a manner that adversely affects public safety.
Put differently, Sudan has purported to define apostasy in such a manner that places it within the realms
of the exception in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR.103
General Comment 22 issued by the Human Rights Committee reinforces the notion that the punishment
of apostasy is a violation of the ICCPR. Para. 3 states: "Article 18 does not permit any limitations
whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or the freedom to have or adopt a religion or
belief of one's choice.” Para. 5 states : "The Committee observes that the freedom to 'have or to adopt'
a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to
replace one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to
retain one's religion or belief."

6.1 Punishment of Apostasy as a violation of International Human Rights Law
The approach adopted by the schools of Islamic jurisprudence with respect to the punishment of
apostasy is at odds with the human rights standards noted above. They raise two important legal
questions. Can the crime of apostasy (and punishment of the same) be reconciled with international
human rights law? Are States that are party to the ICCPR that retain the crime of apostasy and\or fail
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to protect persons from punishment for leaving Islam acting in accordance with their obligations under
international law?
According to most legal commentators who address these questions from a human rights law
perspective, the answer to both questions is in the negative. Those who take the opposite position
generally interpret human rights standards in accordance with a traditional view of Islamic law. Their
approach invariably assigns priority to their view on Islamic law.
UN human rights bodies have adopted the view that the punishment of persons who depart from Islam
cannot be reconciled with fundamental human rights standards.104 The Human Rights Committee’s
General Comments on the ICCPR states that all human beings, regardless of who they are and where
they live, have the right to:
… choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief with
another or to adopt atheistic views ... Article 18.2 bars coercion that would impair the right to
have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions
to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to
recant their religion or belief or to convert.105
The Human Rights Committee has also made clear that the ICCPR:
does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or
on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's choice. These freedoms are
protected unconditionally, as is the right of everyone to hold opinions without interference
from the State.106
Moreover the Human Rights Committee confirmed that ‘in accordance with Articles 18 .2 and 17, no
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one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.’107 For these reasons,
States Parties to the ICCPR (who include almost all Muslim States) have a responsibility to protect
persons who choose to change their religion. Laws which permit the punishment of those who leave
Islam or any other religion or ideology for that matter, are in clear violation of the ICCPR. This is
evident from the following comment by the Committee:

the freedom to ‘have or to adopt’ a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a
religion or belief, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief with another or
to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one's religion or belief.108 (Italics added)
A further layer of protection under international law to those who change or abandon their religion
arises from the status of the right to freedoms of religion and belief as a peremptory norm of
international law.109 In General Comment 24, the Human Rights Committee stated that 'The
fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the fact that this provision cannot be
derogated from, even in time of public emergency, as stated in article 4.2 of the ICCPR.'110 It also
notes that:
Reservations that offend peremptory norms would not be compatible with the object and
purpose of the ICCPR. Although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between
States allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of general international law, it is
otherwise in human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction.
Accordingly, provisions in the ICCPR that represent customary international law (and a fortiori
when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of reservations.
Accordingly, a State may not reserve the right to … deny freedom of thought, conscience and
religion ….111
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Thus, a State may not reserve the right to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
approach reflects the prevailing view among legal scholars, namely that in the case of peremptory
norms of international, there can be no derogation by States.112 In any case, as a number of
commentators have observed, no Muslim State has ever entered a reservation to the ICCPR with regard
to imposition of the death penalty for apostasy.113 Such States are therefore bound, under treaty law at
least, to guarantee the right to freedom of religion to their citizens. However, not all Muslim-majority
States are parties to the ICCPR. Prominent non-parties include Saudi Arabia and Malaysia.
The extent to which non-parties are bound, under customary international law, by norms contained in
the ICCPR is the subject of doctrinal debate. The existence of a customary norm is dependent upon
both state practice and opinio juris pointing towards the existence of the norm.114 According to
Goldsmith and Posner, while there is said to be a large body of customary international human rights
law, it does not reflect a general and consistent body of State practice.115 Instead, customary
international law on human rights is based more on human rights consensus found in General Assembly
resolutions, multilateral treaties and the writings of scholars and less on State practice. As this body of
'law' has very little influence on State behaviour, this raises doubts as to whether it is indeed binding
under custom.116 Nonetheless, there are a number of human rights that have been recognised as
peremptory norms of international law. Significantly, the Human Rights Committee has recognised
freedom of religion as a norm that is not capable of derogation. Moreover, General Comment 24
suggests that this right forms part of customary international law.117 If so, Saudi Arabia cannot ignore
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it and must recognise and protect the customary law right of its citizens to exercise freedom of religion
and belief.

7. The Importance of Reform in the Context of Violence by Radical Islamists
One practical step that Muslim States could take to undermine the ideology of al-Qaeda and its ilk (and
at the same time bring their law and practice into closer conformity with the ICCPR) is to amend their
domestic law so that the punishment of apostasy is prohibited. In those States where the views of
schools of Islamic law prevail, the legal changes advocated here would require a re-interpretation of
Sharia with respect to punishment of apostasy. A transition in such States towards a legal system that
recognises and fully protects international human rights (such as the right to change religion) would be
expedited if supported by these schools. Robust application of the doctrine of ijtihād (reinterpretation
of Islamic law) may be needed for this new approach to apostasy to be adopted by the Islamic schools
of jurisprudence and embraced by the umma. In applying this doctrine, Islamic law schools could take
account of obligations under international human rights law and perhaps wider factors which shape the
modern world (e.g. globalization, pluralism and democracy). At a political level, reform of law and
practice with regard to apostasy may require an ideological shift in some States. However, given the
history of abuse of apostasy laws, those Muslim States seeking to build stronger and more stable
democracies may benefit from the abolition of these laws.118 Such reform would also undermine a
central plank of al-Qaeda’s ideology: the notion that the killing of apostates is justified under Islamic
law. Muslim States could go further and abolish all crimes against religion (Islam) that operate in a
discriminatory manner.119 The introduction and enforcement of non-discriminatory laws that protect all
members of society from religious hatred and violence could be accompanied by public awareness
campaigns to promote the necessary cultural changes.120
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8. Conclusion
Australia, India and indeed all States whose citizens have been directly exposed to the danger of
violence by radical Islamists should consider all possible causes of the same. One such cause is the
abuse of norms of Islamic law by radical Islamists to justify their actions. In an era of globalisation, all
States, whether Muslim-majority or otherwise, have an interest in addressing this problem. Given the
sensitivity of the issue of apostasy for many Muslims, it is perhaps unsurprising that apostasy laws and
their interpretation has received little attention by Muslim States and organisations in their response to
violence by radical Islamists. However, this does not mean that the issue should be ignored. NonMuslim States, such as Australia and India, have an interest in encouraging various Muslim-majority
States (eg Pakistan and Indonesia) and organisations (including the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference) to tackle the issue. If these States and organisations are willing and able to refute
interpretations of Islamic law that permit violence against civilians, they will make a significant
contribution to the struggle to isolate violent extremists and their radical ideologies.
It is important to acknowledge that the invocation of religious norms to justify attacks against civilians
is only one aspect of the problem of violence by extremists who profess to be Muslims. Analysis of
other causes of violence by radicalised Islamists is beyond the scope of this article. However it must be
acknowledged that strong arguments have been advanced pointing to political rather than religious
considerations as the primary cause of violence by these actors.121 Perhaps the two causes cannot be
separated, particularly in the context of the recent sectarian violence in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is clear
that extremists are citing religious norms in their bid to justify acts of violence against civilians (and
recruit others to engage in such conduct). This phenomena cannot be ignored if the causes and
potential cures of violent extremism are to examined in a comprehensive fashion.
The ideology and actions of violent extremists is having a destabilising effect upon - and undermining
121
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security within - various Muslim States and societies. Measures that would undermine the ideology of
al-Qaeda and other such organisations should therefore be given serious consideration. Yet the
proposals advanced in this article would be difficult to implimented: the notion of law reform to
prohibit the punishment of apostasy would be likely to encounter strong opposition in conservative
Muslim States. Moreover, such reform would not guarantee an end to violence by non-State actors
against those they regard as apostates. Nonetheless, it could play an important role - as part of a
broader counter-terrorism strategy - in addressing the causes of violence against civilians by those who
claim that their conduct is justified under Islamic law.122
It is hoped that this conference paper will help promote further discussion of this issue. It could be
addressed at bilateral and multilateral diplomatic meetings where counter-terrorism law and policy is
addressed. Such international forum include the UN General Assembly (which devised the UN
counter-terrorism plan) and the OIC (a representative body for Muslim States and societies) could
address the issue. Ideally, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy should be revised to comprehensively
tackle the problem of abuse of religious norms of violent extremists. The OIC could support this
process by calling up all Muslim States to reform their law and policy as suggested above.
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